The first direction for using the tool was to counteract shell companies, as they are the basis of the shadow economy. Typically, these are companies with a nominal director, carrying out fictitious mutual settlements. They are used for cashing out criminal proceeds, artificially increasing expenses, tax evasion, and embezzlement of budget funds.

The system already contained signs of unreliable counterparties, such as the absence of employees, low tax burden, legal address at the mass registration site, lack of fixed assets and bank accounts, small authorized capital, and others.

Initially, with the help of the RFM solution, all companies with large turnovers were analyzed for signs of unreliability. FMA analysts, together with Datanomix.pro experts, processed data for more than 2,000 unreliable firms with a turnover of over 3 trillion tenge (about 7 million dollars at that year's exchange rate). Information on these organizations and their financial transactions was uploaded into the system. Thus, a database of shadow flows throughout the country was formed.

All companies were subsequently grouped by certain characteristics into 130 groups, which were transferred to investigative and operational units. By the beginning of 2021, the FMA had successfully liquidated 117 cash-out groups. Among them, 29 organized criminal groups were identified, and 8 of them received convictions.

Practical example
In 2021, a verdict was issued against a group of persons including Sugirbayev, Abdraimov, and five others, who, as part of an organized criminal group, created 21 companies, cashed out 1.4 billion tenge and caused damage to the state for 26 billion tenge.

In the second stage, Datanomix.pro automated the analysis of procedural risks. These are risks such as:

• non-competitive procurement
• overpriced purchases
• conclusion of additional agreements, repeatedly increasing the initial contract amount
• signs of affiliation between participants and customers

Procurement data is open and accessible to anyone on specialized websites. However, the Financial Monitoring Agency has access to additional sources and has more opportunities for analysis.

Thanks to the integration of databases into a single analytical solution, the FMA can now identify the shadow component "on the fly" that is hidden behind overpricing, non-competitive single-source procurement, and other criminal machinations.

The analysis of financial flows from identified shell companies and cash-out groups is now implemented on a FOLLOW THE MONEY basis. The FMA uses the RFM solution to identify theft channels and involved parties, and then transfers the detected criminal schemes to investigative and operational units for suppression.

In addition to the mentioned risks, the system also allows identifying risks preceding theft at the procurement stage.

Practical example
In 2020, using the RFM solution, the FMA detected risks of theft through settlements with shell companies amounting to 1 billion tenge at the Semipalatinsk Machine-Building Plant (a state-owned enterprise specializing in the production of high-passability tracked vehicles and spare parts). As a result of the inspection, the fact of theft was confirmed. The crime was committed by inflating the cost of spare parts and supplying used spare parts, including tank engines, to various military units in the country. The plant's general director was sentenced to seven years in prison.

Since 2021, the Financial Monitoring Agency has been working in the field of protecting citizens' rights, especially rights of socially vulnerable groups. The RFM solution is successfully used to prevent the theft of funds allocated to orphans and people with disabilities. In particular, the system allows monitoring bank accounts of children and analyzing procurement of children's institutions for signs of affiliation and overpricing.

Practical example
As a result of monitoring bank accounts of orphaned children, the theft of benefits in the Almaty Children's Home #1 was detected, amounting to 67 million tenge. It was found that money from the bank cards of 32 children was transferred to the bank account of the children's home teacher M.S. Mustafina and her relatives. Subsequently, part of these funds was cashed out and stolen, and part was spent on personal needs. The responsible parties - the director of the children's institution and the teacher - were held criminally responsible. The teacher was sentenced to 7 years in prison.

Practical example
Using the RFM solution, a theft of 26 million tenge was identified in one of Kazakhstan's children's homes, allocated for the purchase of food and personal hygiene products. All suppliers were affiliated with the institution's management, and products were often supplied at two to three times their actual cost. For example, the children's home purchased bath towels for 11,000 tenge, while their price at the time of purchase did not exceed 4-5 thousand tenge.

In addition, more than 9,000 rye bread rolls were documented at almost 20 tenge each, which the supplier did not ship at all. According to the reports of the children's home, over a year, its wards (60 children) ate 2,200 kg of salmon (3 kg per person per month!). However, only 100 kg was actually delivered. The remaining 2,100 kg were fictitiously purchased from a cash-out group. Moreover, the FMA later found out that this money was legalized, and real estate was purchased with it.

With the help of the RFM solution, the agency began to analyze expenses in the field of cities electricity, heat, and water supply.

Ruslan Ostroumov explains: "Theft of funds and overstatement of expenses at these enterprises lead to an increase in the cost of utility services for the population. Unscrupulous companies fictitiously increase expenses and include them in tariffs. We, ordinary citizens, compensate for the stolen money by paying our utility bills. To date, we have identified unjustified costs in the activities of 22 monopolists, resulting in tariff increases of 17 billion tenge. Investigations have been initiated in 37 cases, within which more than five billion tenge has been returned."

Practical example

In 2021, as a result of analyzing the activities of the JSC "TARAZENERGOCENTER" (energy company providing electricity and heat to the 560,000 citizens of Taraz, the city in southern Kazakhstan), mutual settlements with dubious suppliers were identified during its modernization.

During the inspection, it was confirmed that the management of the energy company fictitiously purchased services for the repair of boiler equipment and a steam turbine from a one-day firm for 3.3 billion tenge. During the investigation, these costs were excluded from the tariff formation, and tariffs for thermal energy for Taraz residents were reduced by 15 percent.